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Descartes first invokes the errors of the senses in the Meditations to generate doubt; 
he suggests that because the senses sometimes deceive, we have reason not to trust 
them. This use of sensory error to fuel a sceptical argument fits a traditional 
interpretation of the Meditations as a work concerned with finding a form of certainty 
that is proof against any sceptical doubt. If we focus instead on Descartes’s aim of 
using the Meditations to lay foundations for his new science, his appeals to sensory 
error take on a different aspect. Descartes’s new science is based on ideas innate in 
the intellect, ideas that are validated by the benevolence of our creator. Appeals to 
sensory error are useful to him in undermining our naïve faith in the senses and 
guiding us to an appreciation of the innate ideas. However, the errors of the senses 
pose problems in the context of Descartes’s appeals to God’s goodness to validate 
innate ideas and natural propensities to belief. A natural tendency to sensory error is 
hard to reconcile with the benevolence of our creator. This paper explores Descartes’s 
responses to the problems of theodicy posed by various forms of sensory error. It  
argues that natural judgements involved in our visual perception of distance, size and 
shape pose a problem of error that resists his usual solutions. 
 
1. Sensory error and scepticism 
 
Descartes first appeals to the errors of the senses in pursuing his plan of demolishing 
all his opinions through doubt. The rationale he gives for this plan in the opening 
sentences of the Meditations is that he acquired many false beliefs in childhood: 
 
‘Some years ago I was struck by the large number of falsehoods that I had accepted as 
true in my childhood, and by the highly doubtful nature of the whole edifice that I had 
subsequently based on them. I realized that it was necessary, once in my life, to 
demolish everything completely and start again right from the foundations...’2 
 
The fact that we acquired some false beliefs in childhood hardly seems to justify 
wholesale demolition of our current beliefs through doubt. This can fuel the thought 
that this is simply a pretext for a project that is actually motivated by the threat of 
scepticism. On this traditional view, Descartes’s project in philosophy is to try to 
defeat the threat of scepticism once and for all, and he pursues it by advancing the 
strongest sceptical arguments he can muster in the hope of finding a form of certainty 
that is proof against any doubt. In the First Meditation he points out that the senses 
sometimes deceive, that we are often deceived in dreams, and finally that for all we 
know we might be subject to wholesale deceit by God or an evil demon, so that we go 
wrong all the time. In the Second Meditation, he finds his first certainty in knowledge 
of his own mind; even if he is being deceived, he is still thinking, and if he thinks he 
                                                        
1 An earlier version of some of this material was presented to a Birkbeck work-in-
progress seminar. I am grateful to my colleagues, especially Stacie Friend, for helpful 
comments and questions on that occasion. 
2 AT VII 17, CSM II 12, tr. alt. References to AT are references by volume and page 
number to C. Adam and P. Tannery (eds.), Oeuvres de Descartes, 11 vols. (Paris: 
Vrin, 1904). References to CSM are references by volume and page number to J. 
Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch (eds.), The Philosophical Writings of 
Descartes Vols. I and II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 
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must exist. But knowledge of one’s own mind is a pretty slender foothold from which 
to rebuild knowledge of the world; and so, in the Third Meditation, Descartes has to 
appeal to a benevolent God as a deus ex machina to slay the evil demon and so pull 
him out of the sceptical hole he has dug for himself.  
 This, I think, is a familiar reading of the progress of the first three 
Meditations; and, I think, it is easy to feel that there is something unsatisfactory about 
Descartes’s progress, so described. After the exhilarating doubt and recovery of the 
first two Meditations, the sudden appearance of God comes as rather a let-down. The 
image of a solitary iconoclastic thinker striking out into the unknown seems very 
modern, indeed appealing; a shamefaced rescue by appeal to a traditional deity seems 
quite the opposite. In one sense, this juxtaposition is not surprising. Descartes is not 
called the father of modern philosophy for nothing; he is plausibly seen as having one 
foot in the medieval world of the Aristotelian schoolmen and one foot in the modern 
world of the scientific revolution.
3
 But we can find a more satisfactory role for 
Descartes’s appeal to a benevolent creator if we read the Meditations not as a heroic 
quest against scepticism, but as an attempt to lay foundations for a new science, a new 
way of understanding the world and our place within it.
4
 For Descartes, the blueprint 
for this new understanding comes from ideas that are innate in us, placed in our minds 
by God. 
 
2. Cartesian physics and the prejudices of the senses 
 
But for the condemnation of Galileo, Descartes’s first published work would have 
been a work of science. In 1633 Descartes was about to publish a book entitled The 
World in which he aimed to ‘explain all the phenomena of nature - i.e. all of physics’ 
– when he heard that Galileo had been condemned for maintaining the movement of 
the earth.
5
 This movement was central to the physics of The World, and Descartes 
preferred to withdraw it rather than ‘publish it in a mutilated form’.6 Instead he set out 
to create the conditions for the favourable reception of his physics. First, in 1637, he 
published the Discourse on the Method with essays on optics, meteorology and 
geometry, samples of the results could be achieved using his method. Then, in 1641, 
he published the Meditations. In a now famous passage, he wrote to Mersenne: 
 
‘...I may tell you, between ourselves, that these six Meditations contain all the 
foundations [fondemens] of my physics. But please do not say so, because those who 
                                                        
3 This is aptly reflected in the title of John Carriero’s recent study of the Meditations, 
Between Two Worlds (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).  
4 This approach to the Meditations has gained prominence in recent decades. For 
influential examples of it, see Margaret Dauler Wilson, Descartes (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), Daniel Garber, ‘Semel in vita: The Scientific 
Background to Descartes’ Meditations’ and Gary Hatfield, ‘The Senses and the 
Fleshless Eye: The Meditations as Cognitive Exercises’, both in A. O. Rorty (ed.), 
Essays on Descartes’ Meditations (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1986), and John Carriero, ‘The First Meditation’, Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly 68 (1987), 222-48. 
5 Letter to Mersenne of 1629, AT I 70, CSMK 7. References to CSMK are references 
to J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch and A. Kenny (eds.), The Philosophical 
Writings of Descartes Vol. III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
6 Letter to Mersenne of 1633, AT I 271, CSMK 41. 
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favour Aristotle would perhaps have more difficulty in approving them. I hope that 
those who read them will imperceptibly [insensiblement] become accustomed to my 
principles, and recognize the truth in them before they notice that they destroy those 
of Aristotle.’7 
 
The metaphysics in the Meditations, then, provide the foundations for Cartesian 
physics. If we think of them as part of Descartes’s campaign to replace the principles 
of Aristotle with the principles of Cartesian physics, the progress of the first three 
Meditations looks very different. According to Cartesian physics, the physical world 
consists of matter divided into parts of different shapes and sizes, moving in different 
ways. The nature of this matter is simply to be extended in three dimensions, to take 
up space. In Descartes’s view, our grasp of the fundamental nature of the physical 
world comes not from our senses but from an innate intellectual idea placed in our 
minds by God, the idea of matter as extension that enables us to understand geometry. 
We also have innate ideas of thought, substance and God. But these ideas are 
obscured by a preoccupation with the senses that begins in childhood and persists into 
adult life. This preoccupation gives rise to many ‘prejudices of the senses’ that 
obstruct our understanding of the true natures of body and mind.
8
 Descartes writes: 
 
‘The senses often impede the mind in many of its operations, and in no case do they 
help in the perception of ideas. The only thing that prevents all of us noticing equally 
well that we have these ideas [sc. innate ideas of mind and God] is that we are too 
occupied with perceiving the images of corporeal things.’9 
 
‘In metaphysics…there is nothing which causes so much effort as making our 
perception of the primary notions clear and distinct…they conflict with many 
prejudices derived from the senses which we have got into the habit of holding from 
our earliest years…’10 
 
One of the primary notions placed in our minds by God is the idea of matter as 
extension. According to this,  
 
‘…nothing whatever belongs to the notion of body except the fact that it is something 
which has length, breadth and depth and is capable of various shapes and motions.’11 
 
However, our grasp of this idea is obstructed by our preoccupation with the sensory 
images of corporeal things. Thanks to this, we all believe that the bodies around us 
have qualities of colour, heat, cold and so on that exactly resemble our sensations. To 
counteract these prejudices of the senses, which ‘offer only darkness’, Descartes seeks 
to steer his readers’ minds away from opinions that they have ‘never properly 
examined - opinions which they have acquired not on the basis of any firm reasoning 
but from the senses alone’.12  
                                                        
7 Letter of 1641, AT III 298, CSMK 173, tr. alt. 
8 See AT VII 440-1, CSM II 296-7. 
9 AT VII 375, CSM II 258, emphasis added. 
10 AT VII 157, CSM II 111, tr. alt., emphasis added. 
11 AT VII 440, CSM II 297, tr. alt. 
12 AT VII 158, CSM II 112. 
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Moreover, in Descartes’s view, Aristotelian philosophy simply codifies this 
naïve preoccupation with the senses. As Aquinas puts it, citing Aristotle, the principle 
of knowledge is in the senses.
13
 The senses receive the likenesses of sensible things, 
and our intellectual understanding of their nature is abstracted from these. On this 
view, all the materials of thought come from the senses; since there is nothing in the 
intellect that was not first in the senses, there are no innate ideas.
14
  
 If we read the first sentence of the Meditations against this background, we 
can see Descartes’s talk of the many false beliefs acquired in childhood not as a 
reference to casual infantile mistakes, but as a reference to the prejudices of the senses 
we have got into the habit of affirming from our earliest years. And when he says that 
what we take to be most true is acquired from the senses, Descartes is voicing the 
view of childhood prejudice and Aristotelian philosophy. This is the view he expects 
his readers to bring to their reading of the text, the view he seeks to unseat. So it is not 
surprising that Descartes should speak of the benefit of the First Meditation doubt as 
he does in the Synopsis: 
 
‘Although the usefulness of such extensive doubt is not apparent at first sight, its 
greatest benefit lies in freeing us from all our prejudices, and providing the easiest 
route by which the mind may be led away from the senses.’15 
 
Undermining our naïve faith in the senses helps to free us from the prejudices of the 
senses imbibed in childhood, while drawing the mind away from the senses enables 
us to turn inwards and discover the intellectual ideas of mind and body innate in our 
minds, as we begin to do in the Second Meditation. Once in our lives, as Descartes 
says in the opening sentences of the Meditations, we need to demolish the views 
based on the prejudices of childhood and start again from new foundations, the 
foundations provided by innate ideas. 
 
3. Innate ideas and the origin of our nature 
 
If we read the First and Second Meditations in this way, in the context of a new 
science based on innate ideas, the appeal to God’s benevolence in the Third 
Meditation takes on a different cast. God is brought in not to slay the evil demon, but 
to respond to a question that arises when we consider the ideas we find within 
ourselves.
16
 Ideas that are innate, that come not from the senses but from within, are 
ideas we possess by nature. But what is their provenance? Where does our nature 
come from? We need to know this to know whether ideas we have by nature can be 
                                                        
13 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Part I, question 84, article 6. 
14 Descartes alludes to the Aristotelian slogan, ‘Whatever is in the intellect must 
previously have been in the senses’ when describing his pre-meditative views in the 
Sixth Meditation (AT VII 75, CSM II 52). 
15 AT VII 12, CSM II 9, tr. alt. 
16 The evil demon doubt (on which the traditional reading focuses) is differentiated in 
the text from the doubt based on ignorance of the origin of our nature. Worries about 
the origin of our nature are introduced as a reason for doubt; the evil demon is 
introduced simply as a device to counteract habitual tendencies to belief (AT VII 22, 




 This question of the origin of our nature is raised explicitly in the First 
Meditation: 
 
‘…firmly rooted in my mind is the long-standing opinion that there is an omnipotent 
God who made me the kind of creature that I am. How do I know that he has not 
brought it about that there is no earth, no sky, no extended thing, no shape, no size, no 
place, while at the same time ensuring that all these things appear to me to exist just 
as they do now? What is more, since I sometimes believe that others go astray in 
cases where they think they have the most perfect knowledge, may I not similarly go 
wrong every time I add two and three or count the sides of a square, or in some even 
simpler matter, if that is imaginable?’18 
 
Here, God is specifically identified as our author of our natures, as the creator who 
made us the kind of creatures that we are. How do we know that this creator has not 
given us a nature that makes us subject to constant error? One might object that this 
would be incompatible with God’s benevolence. But Descartes has a response: 
 
‘…perhaps God would not have allowed me to be tricked in this way, since he is said 
to be supremely good. But if it were inconsistent with his goodness to have created 
me such that I am deceived all the time, it would seem equally foreign to his goodness 
to allow me to be deceived even occasionally; yet this last assertion cannot be 
made.’19 
 
If occasional deception is compatible with God’s goodness, why not constant 
deception? Moreover, the prospect of constant deception is not removed by denying 
that we are the creations of an omnipotent God: 
 
‘Perhaps there may be some who would prefer to deny the existence of so powerful a 
God rather than believe that everything else is uncertain. …yet since to be deceived 
and to err seem to be imperfections, the less powerful they make my original cause, 
the more likely it is that I am so imperfect as to be deceived all the time.’20 
 
In sum, an all-powerful God could surely make us such that we go wrong all the time, 
while a less powerful cause might also produce the kind of nature that is constantly 
mistaken.
21
 To assuage these worries about our nature, we need what might be called 
an origin story; we need to know where our nature comes from, how we come to be 
the kind of creatures that we are. The Third Meditation provides this origin story by 
arguing that we are the creations of a perfect being, God, ‘who is subject to no defects 
whatsoever’.22 This removes both the worry that our originating cause is lacking in 
                                                        
17 Carriero, op. cit. note 4, argues for interpreting Descartes’s concern with the origin 
of our natures in light of his innatism. 
18 AT VII 21, CSM II 14, emphasis added. 
19 AT VII 21, CSM II 14, emphasis added. 
20 AT VII 21, CSM II 14; tr. alt. 
21 The significance of this dilemma argument is stressed by Carriero, op. cit. note 4, 
and by Robert Stoothoff, ‘Descartes’ Dilemma’, The Philosophical Quarterly 39 
(1989), 294-307. 
22 AT VII 52, CSM II 35. 
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power, and the worry that we are the creations of a deceiver. A perfect being ‘cannot 
be a deceiver, since all fraud and deception depend on some defect’.23  
 Descartes’s innatism makes sense of his concern with the origin of our nature. 
But once we have discovered that our creator is benevolent and non-deceiving, the 
problem raised in the First Meditation returns. How can this origin story be reconciled 
with the fact that we are sometimes deceived, that we are sometimes in error? Without 
a satisfactory answer to this question, the suspicion may remain that God’s 
benevolence is compatible with our having a nature that is inherently flawed, a nature 
that disposes us to embrace falsehoods. Moreover, this question arises with particular 
force for Descartes, since he holds that many of the opinions we take for granted are 
in fact erroneous. The main task of the Fourth Meditation is to explain how the 
benevolence of our creator is compatible with the fact that he has given us a nature 
that enables us to make erroneous judgements. In doing so, Descartes takes pains to 
show that our capacity for judgement error can be explained without attributing any 
flaw to the faculties bestowed on us by the author of our nature. 
 
4. Judgement error and the goodness of God 
 
It might seem that the existence of judgement error is easy to reconcile with the 
benevolence of our creator. We are finite, imperfect creatures, so of course we make 
mistakes. But Descartes rejects this solution as unsatisfactory. We have already seen 
that for strategic reasons, Descartes could not rest content with attributing our errors 
to the imperfection of our nature. If we err simply because our nature is imperfect, our 
nature may be so imperfect as to contain false innate ideas, or positive propensities to 
affirm falsehoods. If our having such a nature were compatible with God’s 
benevolence, appeals to that benevolence would be useless as a guarantor of the 
veracity of our innate ideas and propensities. 
A satisfactory solution to the problem of judgement error, Descartes argues, 
must do justice to the fact that error is a privation: ‘error is not a pure negation, but 
rather a privation or lack of some knowledge that somehow should be in me’.24 A 
negation is simply the absence of something that could have been present. God could 
have given us wings, for example, but he has not done so. A privation is more than 
this; it is the absence of something that should be present.
25
 If we judge wrongly only 
through lack of some knowledge that should be present, that suggests that we might 
be able to avoid error by repairing that lack. Descartes’s explanation of our judgement 
errors makes good on this suggestion by attributing them to our incorrect use of our 
freedom of will. The intellect perceives ideas, the contents of potential judgements; 
the ideas are affirmed or denied by an act of will. Erroneous judgements come about 
when we use our freedom of will to assent in cases where our perception is not 
sufficiently clear and distinct to discern the truth.
26
 
                                                        
23 AT VII 52, CSM II 35. 
24 AT VII 55, CSM II 38.  
25 For helpful discussion of the negation/privation distinction and its role in 
Descartes’s argument, see Lex Newman, ‘The Fourth Meditation’, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 70 (1999), 559-91, especially sections 1.1-2. 
 
26 As is often noted, Descartes’s solution to the problem of judgement error parallels a 
traditional solution to the problem of evil. That solution reconciles the evils of human 
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‘If I simply refrain from making a judgement in cases where I do not perceive the 
truth with sufficient clarity and distinctness, then it is clear that I am behaving 
correctly and avoiding error. But if in such cases I affirm or deny, then I am not using 
my free will correctly. …In this incorrect use of free will may be found the privation 
which constitutes the essence of error.’27 
 
The privation involved in judgement error arises from our incorrect use of free will; 
we fail to take account of the fact that ‘the [sc. clear] perception of the intellect should 
precede the determination of the will’, and so we assent in cases where we do not 
fully understand.
28
 We are responsible for the incorrect use of our freedom that 
constitutes the essence of error; ‘the privation, I say, lies in the operation of the will in 
so far as it proceeds from me’.29  
 Descartes’s explanation of our errors of judgement is designed to show that 
they do not arise from any defects in the faculties given to us by God. Our power of 
willing is not the source of our errors, since it is ‘extremely ample and also perfect of 
its kind.’30 The intellect is not to blame; since it comes from God, everything we 
understand, we understand correctly.
31
 Indeed, at the end of the Fourth Meditation 





‘…every clear and distinct perception is undoubtedly something and so cannot be 
from nothing, but necessarily has God for its author, God, I say, who is supremely 
perfect, who cannot be a deceiver on pain of contradiction; and therefore it is 
undoubtedly true.’33 
 
If what comes from God must be true, the story of our divine origin seems to 
vindicate our innate ideas and innate propensities. Surely nothing that we receive 
from a God who is ‘supremely good and the source of truth’34 could lead us astray. 
 
5. The errors of the senses and the goodness of God 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
sin with the perfection of our creator by attributing it to our misuse of our freedom of 
will. 
27 AT VII 59-60, CSM II 41, emphasis added. 
28 AT VII 60, CSM II 41. 
29 AT VII 60, CSM II 41. 
30 AT VII 58, CSM II 40. 
31 AT VII 58, CSM II 40. 
32 Descartes says in the Third Meditation that ideas considered solely in themselves, 
and not referred to anything else, cannot strictly speaking be false (AT VII 37, CSM 
II 26). This might suggest that ideas considered solely in themselves cannot be true 
either. However, the Fourth Meditation passage is one of several places in which 
Descartes speaks of ideas as being true. See also AT VII 46, CSM II 32, where he 
describes the idea of God as true. See Carriero, op. cit. note 3, 309-11, for helpful 
discussion. 
33 AT VII 62, CSM II 43, tr. alt. 
34 AT VII 22, CSM II 15. 
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But this is not the end of the matter. The faculty of sensation is also part of our God-
given nature. In the context of his campaign against naïve-cum-Aristotelian views, 
Descartes warns us of the deceitfulness of the senses and the error of trusting the 
senses rather than the intellect. But in the context of his story about the benevolence 
of our creator, the deceitfulness of the senses seems to pose a problem of theodicy 
that parallels the problem of judgement error. If our creator is no deceiver, why has he 
equipped us with what seems to be a deceitful faculty of sensation? 
As first step to answering this question, we need to unpack Descartes’s talk of 
the errors, deceptions and prejudices of the senses. As a first step, let us turn to a 
passage from the Sixth Replies in which Descartes clarifies what he means by saying 
that the senses are less reliable than the intellect. This is a passage in which Descartes 
draws an important distinction between three grades of sensation. 
 
6. Errors of sensation and errors of judgement 
 
The authors of the Sixth Objections pose a challenge to Descartes’s claim that the 
reliability of the intellect is much greater than that of the senses.
35
 ‘How’, they ask, 
‘can the intellect enjoy any certainty unless it has previously derived it from the 
senses when they are working as they should?’.36 They cite the example of a stick that 
is straight, but looks bent in water because of refraction. Here, they claim, the sense of 
touch corrects an error made by the sense of sight, a correction that the intellect could 
not make on its own.
37
  
Descartes responds that there is in fact no error of sensation in this case; 
rather, there is an erroneous judgment that is corrected by another judgement. He 
supports this diagnosis by distinguishing three grades in what is called ‘sensation’. 
The first is purely corporeal; it consists in the stimulation of the bodily organs by 
external objects, and subsequent motions in the nerves and brain.
38
 The second grade  
 
‘comprises all the immediate effects produced in the mind as a result of its being 
united with a bodily organ that is affected in this way. Such effects include 
perceptions of pain, pleasure, thirst, hunger, colours, sound, taste, smell, heat, cold 
and the like, which arise from the union and as it were intermingling of mind and 
body’.39 
 
The third grade of sensation ‘includes all the judgements about things outside us 
which we have been accustomed to make from our earliest years on the occasion of 
the movements of these bodily organs’.40 Descartes goes on to explain that nothing 
beyond the second grade ‘should be referred to sensation, if we wish to distinguish it 
carefully from the intellect.’41 Nonetheless, he says,  
 
‘when from our earliest years we have made judgements, and even rational 
inferences, about the things that affect our senses…we refer them to sensation, 
                                                        
35 AT VII 418, CSM II 281-2. 
36 AT VII 418, CSM II 282. 
37 Ibid. 
38 AT VII 436-7, CSM II 294-5. 
39 AT VII 347, CSM II 294. 
40 AT VII 437, CSM II 295, tr. alt., emphasis added. 
41 Ibid,, tr. alt. 
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because we reason and judge so quickly because of habit, or rather we remember 
judgements we made earlier about similar things, so we do not distinguish these 
operations from a simple sense perception.’42 
 
According to Descartes, then, sense-perception proper ends with the perceptions of 
pain, thirst, colour, heat and so on that occur in the mind as the immediate effects of 
movements in the brain. However, these perceptions are followed by inferences and 
judgements that go unnoticed, because they are so fast, habitual and familiar. Since 
they go unnoticed, they are confused with simple sense perceptions.  
This confusion of habitual judgement with sensation, Descartes argues, lies 
behind the objectors’ claim that the sense of touch corrects an error made by the sense 
of sight. Strictly speaking, there is no error of sensation here:  
 
‘we are not here dealing with the first and second grades of sensation, because no 
falsity can occur in them’.43 
 
This is a striking claim. Descartes insists that no falsity can occur in the perceptions 
of pain, pleasure, thirst, hunger, colours, sound, taste, smell, heat, cold and the like 
that occur at the second grade of sensation. Though this claim it may sound odd in 
view of his talk of the deceptions of the senses, it is just what we should expect, given 
that the faculty of sensation is part of our nature as embodied minds. Sensory 
perceptions are simply the natural effects of movements occurring in the body. Since 
they are a consequence of the workings of a nature created by a benevolent God, 
Descartes has good reason to say that there is no falsity in them.
 44
 
Where, then, is the error that the objectors attribute to the sense of sight? 
According to Descartes, it is the product of judgements occurring after the second 
grade of sensation. He explains that ‘when people say that a stick in water “appears 
bent because of refraction”’, they mean that ‘it appears to us in a way which would 
lead a child to judge that it was bent’, and may even cause us to make the same 
judgement, if we follow our childhood prejudices.
45
 The correction of the error is also 
the work of judgement rather than of the senses. First we judge that the stick is 
straight as a result of touching it, then we judge that the judgement based on touch is 
to be preferred to the judgement based on vision.
46
 So when the senses are said to be 
less reliable than the intellect, ‘the senses’ means habitual childhood judgements 
occurring at the third grade of sensation. To say that the intellect is more reliable than 
                                                        
42 AT VII 438, CSM II 295, tr. alt., emphasis added. 
43 AT VII 438, CSM II 295-6, tr. alt., emphasis added. The claim that there is no 
falsity in the senses has a long pedigree. Aristotle writes in De Anima III.6 that the 
senses cannot be deceived about their special objects (418a11). However, error is 
possible about objects perceived by more than one sense, such as size (De Anima 
III.3, 428b17). 
44 As we will see in sections 8 and 9 below, Descartes holds that sensations of thirst 
and pain occurring at the second grade of sensation can be erroneous when conditions 
are abnormal, and he has a story to tell about how this comports with God’s goodness. 
The objectors to whom he is responding in the Sixth Replies explicitly limit their 
discussion to cases where the senses are working as they should, which may be why 
he does not mention these errors here. 
45 AT VII 438-9, CSM II 296. 
46 AT VII 439, CSM II 296. 
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the senses, then, is to say that mature, considered judgements are more reliable than 
infantile, unconsidered judgements; and this, Descartes says, is true.
47
  
 This passage provides important clarification of Descartes’s talk of sensory 
error. It is not sensation proper that is in error, he says, but judgements that we have 
habitually made since childhood and that we do not distinguish from sensation. This 
recasting of errors of sensation as errors of judgement puts a different spin on 
Descartes’s talk of the malign influence of senses. The so-called “prejudices of the 
senses” are evidently judgements, precisely because they are prejudices (pre-
judgements) - judgements made before the intellect has examined the matter. 
Opinions acquired on basis of the senses, and never properly examined, are also 
judgements. But “errors of the senses” that are actually errors of judgement can be 
dealt with the account given in the Fourth Meditation.
48
 The defect leading to these 
errors is not a defect in the faculty of sensation that God has given us, but consists in 
our wilful assent in cases where we do not perceive sufficiently clearly and distinctly. 
 
7. A natural propensity to false resemblance judgements? 
 
If Descartes’s talk of errors of the senses can be recast as referring to erroneous 
judgements, they do not pose a further problem of error. However, Descartes not only 
speaks of the prejudices of the senses, he speaks of erroneous judgements that we 
seem to be ‘taught by Nature’ to make, and this threatens to pose another problem of 
error. It is as hard to see how a veracious God could give us a natural propensity to 
make false judgements as it is to see how such a God could give us a deceitful faculty 
of sensation.  
 What are these false judgements that we seem to have a natural propensity to 
make? As noted earlier, we all believe that the bodies around us have qualities of 
colour, heat, cold and so on that exactly resemble our sensations. And early in the 
Third Meditation, Descartes identifies what he calls ‘the chiefest and most common 
mistake’ in our judgements, that of judging that external bodies wholly resemble our 
sensory perceptions.
49
 He gives some examples in the Sixth Meditation: we judge that 
‘heat in a body is something exactly resembling the [sensory] idea of heat that is in 
me’, that ‘when a body is white or green, the selfsame whiteness or greenness which I 
                                                        
47 AT VII 438, CSM II 295. 
48 Some interpreters hold that third-grade judgements are not judgements in the full-
blooded sense of the Fourth Meditation. This is the view taken by Alison Simmons, 
‘Descartes on the Cognitive Structure of Sensory Experience’, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 67 (2003), 549-79, 566-7 and by Cecelia Wee, Material 
Falsity and Error in Descartes’s Meditations (London and New York: Routledge, 
2006), 69-70. Since Descartes attributes third-level judgements to the intellect alone, 
they read him as referring to an act of combining ideas that involves only the intellect 
and not the will. I read Descartes’s talk of the intellect alone as designed to emphasise 
that the senses are not involved, rather than to exclude any role for the will. This 
reading gains support from the fact that Descartes associates judgements in the full-
blooded sense with the ‘intellect alone’ at the end of the Second Meditation, where his 
point is also to contrast judgement with the senses and imagination (AT VII 33, CSM 
II 22). Here Descartes uses ‘intellect’ as an umbrella term to cover intellect and will, 
the faculties of pure mind, when a contrast is being made with the faculties of the 
embodied mind. 
49 AT VII 37, CSM II 26.  
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perceive through my senses is present in the body’, and that ‘stars and towers and 
other distant bodies have the same size and shape which they present to my senses.’50 
By Descartes’s lights, the belief that heat in a body is something exactly resembling 
the idea of heat that is in me, and the belief that stars have the same size which they 
present to my senses, are false.
 
Heat as it exists in a body, for example, is to be 
understood in terms of the motions of matter. A star is a distant sun, many times 
larger than the earth. Nevertheless, Descartes depicts the tendency to form these false 
beliefs as universal; we all have a tendency to form what we might call ‘resemblance 
judgements’ – to believe that bodies exactly resemble the sensory perceptions they 
cause in us. Moreover, in the Third and Sixth Meditations he alludes to the idea that 
we are ‘taught by Nature’ to believe that external bodies wholly resemble our sensory 
perceptions of them.
51
 Not surprisingly, then, many commentators read Descartes as 




If God has given us a tendency to form a host of false beliefs, that surely poses 
a problem of theodicy. How could a non-deceiving God have given us such a 
propensity to error? This would be hard to reconcile with Descartes’s claim that  
 
‘Since God is the supreme being, he must also be supremely good and true, and it 
would therefore be a contradiction that anything should be created by him which 
positively tends towards falsehood.’53 
 
Moreover, Descartes’s argument for the existence of material things is based on the 
premise that a propensity to belief that is given to us by God must be trustworthy. 
Descartes argues that God has given us a ‘great propensity’ to believe that our sensory 
perceptions are caused by material things, and since God is no deceiver, this belief 
must be true.
54
 He goes on to make the more general claim that  
 
‘…everything that I am taught by nature contains some truth. For if nature is 
considered in its general aspect, then I understand by the term nothing other than God 
himself…and by my own nature in particular I understand nothing other than the 
totality of things bestowed on me by God.’55 
                                                        
50 AT VII 82, CSM II 56-7. 
51 AT VII 38, CSM II 26; AT VII 76, CSM II 53. 
52 See for example, Gary Hatfield, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Descartes and 
the Meditations (London: Routledge, 2003), 262. He writes that ‘we have a natural 
inclination to affirm the resemblance thesis’ and that ‘He [God] has given us a 
tendency to believe that things are as they appear to us’. Deborah Brown, ‘Descartes 
on True and False Ideas’ in J. Broughton and J. Carriero (eds.), A Companion to 
Descartes (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), speaks of the senses as disposing us to judge 
incorrectly that the world is a certain way (197), and of our having ‘a very natural and 
useful inclination’ to externalize the content of our sensory ideas (214). Raffaela De 
Rosa, Descartes and the Puzzle of Sensory Representation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 26, claims that according to Descartes, our nature as a 
combination of mind and body erroneously teaches us that heat in a body is 
something exactly resembling the idea of heat which is in us, and so on.  
53 AT VII 144, CSM II 103. 
54 AT VII 80, CSM II 55. 
55 AT VII 80, CSM II 56. 
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It is hard to see how these claims about God’s veracity could be squared with the 
claim that we have a natural propensity to form a host of false beliefs about the 
resemblance between external bodies and our sensory perceptions. 
Fortunately, Descartes does not face the task of reconciling these two claims. 
He does not hold, and indeed explicitly denies, that we have a natural propensity to 
form resemblance judgements. Far from being something we are taught by nature, he 
claims, such beliefs are prejudices that we affirm through habit. Descartes writes:  
 
‘…there are many other things which I may appear to have been taught by nature, but 
which in reality I acquired not from nature but from a habit of making ill-considered 
judgements; and it is therefore quite possible that these are false.’56 
 
Descartes takes pains to emphasise that these habitual resemblance judgements do not 
derive from any real or positive propensity: 
 
‘…although a star has no greater effect on my eye than the flame of a small light, that 
does not mean that there is any real or positive propensity in me to believe that the 
star is no bigger than the light; I have simply made this judgement from childhood 
onwards with out any rational basis.’57 
 
Given his views on what follows from God’s veracity, he has good reason to 
emphasise this. A real propensity to believe would come from God, since ‘everything 
real which is in us must have been bestowed on us by God’.58 But a real propensity to 
believe that a star is no bigger than a small light would be a real propensity to believe 
a falsehood, and a non-deceiving God would not give us such a propensity.  
For Descartes, then, we have no natural propensity to form resemblance 
judgements; we cannot, given the veracity of our creator. How, then, do we come to 
make them? Well, we already know from the Fourth Meditation that we form false 
beliefs because we judge where we do not perceive the truth sufficiently clearly and 
distinctly. When we do so, we forget that ‘the perception of the intellect should 
always precede the determination of the will’.59 That is just what we are doing, 
Descartes explains in the Sixth Meditation, when we draw conclusions from sensory 
perceptions about things located outside us ‘without waiting until the intellect has 
examined the matter’.60  
But this still leaves something unaccounted for. Our capacity to jump to 
conclusions explains how we are able to make ill-considered judgements, but it does 
not explain why we form these particular ill-considered judgements, nor why we all 
jump to the same conclusions. Without an account of this, Descartes’s account looks 
incomplete. Descartes does have a story to tell here, one which begins with his 
diagnosis of where we go wrong in these cases: 
 
‘…I see that I have been in the habit of misusing the order of nature. The proper 
purpose of the sensory perceptions given me by nature is simply to inform the mind of 
                                                        
56 AT VII 82, CSM II 56, emphasis added. 
57 AT VII 83, CSM II 57, tr. alt., emphasis added. 
58 AT VII 144, CSM II 103. 
59 AT VII 60, CSM II 41. 
60 AT VII 82, CSM II 57. 
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what is beneficial or harmful for the composite of which the mind is a part; and to this 
extent they are sufficiently clear and distinct. But I use them as reliable rules for 
immediately discerning the essence of the bodies located outside us, about which they 
signify nothing that is not obscure and confused.’61 
 
Descartes claims that this habit of misusing sensory perceptions begins with our 
childhood preoccupation with the senses. As he depicts it in the Sixth Meditation, 
because we know external things only on the basis of our sensory ideas, we suppose 
that external things resemble these ideas.
62
 Moreover, we take the supposition of 
complete resemblance to be something we are taught by nature; hence, Descartes 
initially describes it in the Third Meditation as something we are ‘apparently’ taught 
by nature. In the Sixth Meditation, the supposition is revealed as habitual, rather than 
natural. Our nature as embodied beings teaches us to avoid things that cause pain and 
seek things that cause pleasure, but it does not teach us to draw conclusions about 
external bodies from sensory perceptions without proper intellectual examination.
63
 
Beliefs reflecting the assumption that external objects wholly resemble our sensory 
perceptions are made through habit, not through natural propensity.  
 
8. True errors of nature 
 
All the so-called “errors of the senses” discussed so far have been reduced to errors of 
judgement. They are errors we make by judging too hurriedly, by, by affirming what 
we are in the habit of affirming; they do not indicate any deceit in the faculties, 
propensities or ideas that we possess by nature. However, Descartes’s claims about 
what our natures teach, about the purpose for which God has given us sensory 
perceptions, point us towards cases of genuinely sensory error.  
 Internal sensations of pain, thirst, hunger are given to us to inform us of 
harms to the mind-body composite, of what would be beneficial to the composite. 
These occur at the second grade of sensation, so they are part of sensing proper.  But 
these sensations can mislead. In the second part of the Sixth Meditation, Descartes 
discusses the cases of the person with pain in a limb that no longer exists, and of the 
person with dropsy who feels thirst when drinking would be harmful. Descartes 
signals clearly that such cases present a new problem of theodicy, not reducible to the 
problem of judgement error.  
 
 ‘I have already looked in sufficient detail at how, notwithstanding the goodness of 
God, my judgements are false. But a further problem now comes to mind regarding 
those very things which nature presents to me as objects which I should seek out or 
avoid, and also regarding the internal sensations, where I seem to have detected 
errors…’64 
 
He identifies two forms of error here: cases in which nature presents something as 
beneficial when it is in fact harmful, and cases of error in the internal senses. The 
                                                        
61 AT VII 83, CSM II 57-8, tr. alt. 
62 AT VII 75, CSM II 52. 
63 AT VII 82, CSM II 57. I discuss teachings of nature in more detail in ‘Descartes on 
Nature, Habit and the Corporeal World’, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 
87 (2013), 235-58, secs. 2 and 3. 
64 AT VII 83, CSM II 58, emphasis added. 
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dropsy case is an example of the first kind of error, while phantom limb pain is an 
example of the second.
65
 How is the existence of these errors to be reconciled with the 
goodness of our creator? This is the problem that Descartes faces, and it is one he 
takes very seriously. It cannot be dismissed, he argues, simply by saying that the 
nature of the person with dropsy is disordered by the disease:  
 
‘A sick man is no less one of God’s creatures than a healthy one, and it seems no less 
a contradiction to suppose that he has received from God a nature which deceives 
him.’66  
 
He takes pains to emphasise that in a case of dropsy, the human being or mind-body 
composite is subject to what he calls a ‘true error of nature’ in being thirsty when 
drinking will cause it harm.
67
 Here our God-given nature leads us astray. So ‘it 
remains to inquire how it is that the goodness of God does not prevent nature…from 
deceiving us’.68  
Descartes’s explanation of how these errors can occur in a nature created by a 
perfect God is very different from his theodicy of judgement error. Judgement error is 
made possible by the difference in scope of will and intellect, and made actual by our 
misuse of freedom of will. What Descartes calls ‘true errors of nature’ are erroneous 
sensations; and since sensations are involuntary, the misuse of our wills cannot be 
responsible for them. Instead, Descartes offers a theodicy of these errors of nature that 
exploits his account of human beings as composites of mind and body.  
 
9. Natural deceptions of the senses and the goodness of God  
 
Descartes’s explanation of what he calls ‘natural deceptions of the senses’ turns on his 
account of our nature as minds united to mechanical bodies. He compares the human 
body to a clock, depicting it as ‘a kind of machine equipped with and made up of 
bones, nerves, muscles, veins, blood and skin’.69 The mind united to the body is 
affected by motions in only one part of it, the part of the brain that contains the 
common sense (elsewhere identified with the pineal gland).
70
 Moreover, motions in 
the brain are paired one-to-one with sensations in a fixed correspondence. A given 
motion in the gland causes ‘just one corresponding sensation’ in the mind.71 This 
holds true no matter how the motion in the pineal gland has been produced. Given 
these constraints, Descartes says, the best system that could be devised is that a given 
motion in the gland should produce ‘the one sensation which, of all possible 
                                                        
65 Phantom limb pain is also mentioned earlier in the Sixth Meditation as an example 
of error in the internal senses, when Descartes is surveying reasons for doubting the 
senses (AT VII 77, CSM II 53). He presents it alongside cases of error in ‘the 
judgements of the external senses’, such as errors about the shape of distant towers 
(AT VII 76, CSM II 53).  
66 AT VII 84, CSM II 58. 
67 AT VII 86, CSM II 59. 
68 AT VII 86, CSM II 59. 
69 AT VII 84, CSM II 58. 
70 See the Optics, AT VI 129 and the Treatise on Man, AT XI 175, CSM I 105. 
71 AT VII 87, CSM II 60. 
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sensations, is most especially and most frequently conducive to the preservation of the 
healthy man’.72 Furthermore, he claims that  
 
‘experience shows that the sensations which nature has given us are all of this kind; so 
there is absolutely nothing to be found in them that does not testify to the power and 
goodness of God.’73 
 
Although God has devised the signalling system that best conduces to the 
preservation of our health, occasional errors are inevitable: ‘notwithstanding the 
immense goodness of God, the nature of man as a combination of mind and body is 
such that it is bound to mislead him from time to time.’ 74 It is possible for motions in 
the pineal gland to be caused by neural events other than those they are intended to 
signal to the mind, and when they are, the resultant sensation is ‘naturally 
deceptive’.75 This is what happens in the cases Descartes singles out, those of 
phantom limb pain and dropsy. Suppose a foot has been amputated. Motions can still 
occur in the nerves that used to lead from the foot to the brain, and when they are 
transmitted to the brain they produce a sensation of pain as in the foot. Suppose that in 
dropsy, the throat is dry because fluid is accumulating elsewhere in the body. The 
dryness of the throat will cause motions in the nerves and in the brain that induce a 
sensation of thirst. The fact that God has given us a nature that is subject to these 
errors is not inconsistent with his goodness, because God has paired sensations with 




10. The errors of the senses and the goodness of God revisited 
 
The question we are concerned with is whether Descartes manages to reconcile the 
fact that we are subject to sensory error with the perfection of our creator. And it 
seems that he does. Consider again the three grades of sensation. No falsity can occur 
in the first grade, since this is just a matter of motions in nerves. No falsity occurs in 
the perceptions of the second grade, though sensations of thirst, hunger and pain can 
be deceptive when conditions are out of the ordinary. But as we have seen, Descartes 
argues that this occasional misrepresentation is an inevitable consequence of an 
internal signalling system that is the best it can be, given the limitations of a being 
composed of mind and body. Error at the third grade of so-called sensation is actually 
error in judgement. We have no natural propensity to make false judgements on the 
basis of sensory perceptions; our tendency to do so is the result of habits formed in 
childhood, when we lacked the use of reason.  
 Descartes seems to be home and dry; he seems to have strategies for 
reconciling all our putatively sensory errors with the perfection of our creator. 
However, I think it would be premature to think that this is the end of the matter. 
                                                        
72 AT VII 87, CSM II 60. 
73 AT VII 87, CSM II 60. 
74 AT VII 88, CSM II 61; tr. alt., emphasis added. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Descartes implies both that it is better for God to design the system to preserve the 
healthy (‘well-constituted’) body, and that the circumstances for which the system is 
designed are more common than those for which it is not (the motion signalling 
damage to the foot more frequently arises from such damage than from another 
cause). 
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According to Descartes’s account of vision, our perception of the size, shape and 
position of objects is very often erroneous. On a natural reading of his account, these 
errors are due to erroneous judgements that contribute to the construction of our 
visual experience. (Recall the discussion in the Sixth Replies of how we perceive the 
shape of a stick.) Since they form part of the natural processes responsible for visual 
perception, they would seem to be judgements we have a natural propensity to make. 
If this is so, this poses a further problem of error for Descartes, a problem that has 
received little attention from commentators.
77
 To see how these errors arise, we need 
to turn to Descartes’s account of how visual perception works. 
 
11. Descartes’s account of how we see position, distance, size and shape 
 
Descartes’s fullest account of vision appears in the Optics, published in 1637.78 This 
is the account to which he refers the reader in the passage in the Sixth Replies in 
which he distinguishes between the three grades of sensation. The Optics explains 
how light rays reflected by an object are focussed on the back of eye, tracing its image 
on the retina as a pattern of motion. This image is transmitted by nerves to the brain, 
where it appears as a pattern of motion on the surface of the pineal gland.
79
 As in the 
explanation of sensory signalling in the Sixth Meditation, these patterns of motion in 
the brain naturally produce certain sensations in the mind:  
 
‘it is the movements composing this picture which, acting on our soul insofar as it is 
united to our body, are ordained by nature to make it have such sensations’.80 
 
We are now at the second grade of sensation, that of the immediate effects in mind of 
motions in the body. Discussing the example of seeing a stick in the Sixth Replies, 
Descartes says this grade ‘extends to the mere perception of the colour and light 
reflected from the stick’.81 He explains in the Optics that the force of the movements 
in the relevant part of the brain makes the soul have a sensation of light, while the 
manner of these movements makes it have sensations of colour.
82
 So Descartes 
                                                        
77 Celia Wolf-Devine does recognize that these erroneous judgements threaten to pose 
a problem of error. She writes that Descartes’s assigning our perceptual errors to 
erroneous judgements helps him to reconcile those errors with God’s benevolence. 
See Descartes on Seeing: Epistemology and Visual Perception (Carbondale and 
Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1993), 87. I argue below that these 
judgements are ones we are have a natural propensity to make, and that the problem 
of reconciling them with God’s benevolence therefore remains.  
78 For further discussion of Descartes’s account of vision, see op. cit. note 77, Gary 
Hatfield, ‘Descartes’ Physiology and its Relation to his Psychology’ in J. Cottingham 
(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Descartes (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992) and Celia Wolf-Devine, ‘Descartes’ Theory of Visual Spatial Perception’ 
in S. Gaukroger, J. Schuster and J. Sutton, Descartes’ Natural Philosophy (London: 
Routledge, 2000). 
79 AT VI 128, CSM I 167. 
80 AT VI 130, CSM I 167. 
81 AT VII 437, CSM II 295. 
82 AT VI 130, CSM I 167. 
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appears to think of the immediate mental effect of brain motions at the second grade 
as a perception of a two-dimensional pattern of colour.
83
 
Nonetheless, light and colour are not the only qualities we see; we also 
perceive ‘position, distance, size and shape’ by sight.84 To perceive the position, 
distance, size and shape of objects, the mind needs more information than is present 
in the two-dimensional image alone. Information about location is crucial, as 
Descartes recognises, since we need it to determine the size and shape of objects on 
the basis of the two-dimensional image. A small object located near the eye can 
project the same image as a large object positioned further from the eye. So how do 
we determine an object’s distance from us?  
Descartes details four methods we use. Firstly, the shape of the eye varies 
depending on whether it is focussing light from an object close to us or from an object 
further away. These changes in the shape of the eye are accompanied by a change in 
the brain which is ‘ordained by nature to make the soul perceive this distance’.85 
Secondly, we can determine the distance of an object ‘as if by a natural geometry’.86 
Imagine a line drawn between our two eyes A and B. This line AB forms the base of a 
triangle with X, the object seen, at its apex. If we know the length of the line AB and 
the size of the visual angles XAB and XBA, we can calculate how far the object X is 
from our eyes. The magnitudes of the line AB and the angles XAB and XBA combine 
together in our imagination and enable us to perceive the distance of X by an action of 
thought which although ‘a simple act of the imagination, implicitly contains a 
reasoning quite similar to that used by surveyors’.87 
 The third way of perceiving distance is through ‘the distinctness or 
indistinctness of the shape seen, together with the strength of weakness of the light’.88 
Objects further or nearer than the object X are seen less distinctly. If they reflect light 
more strongly than they would if they were at the same distance as X, we judge 
(jugeons) them to be nearer; if they reflect light more weakly, we judge them to be 
further.
89
 Fourthly and finally, when we ‘already imagine’ the size or position of an 
object, or the distinctness of its shape and its colours, or merely the strength of the 
light that comes from it, this can enable us to imagine, though not to see, its 
distance.
90
 For example, Descartes says, if we look from afar at something we are 
used to seeing close at hand, ‘we judge [jugeons] its distance much better than we 
would if its size were less well known to us’.91 If we look at a sunlit mountain beyond 
a forest in shadow, ‘it is only the position of the forest that makes us judge [juger] it 
                                                        
83 Descartes says in the Optics that we can only discriminate the parts of the bodies 
we look at if they differ in colour (AT VI 133, CSM I 168), and speaks in the Sixth 
Replies of a perception of ‘the extension of the colour and its boundaries’ (AT VII 
437, CSM II 295). So, as Simmons notes, expanses of colour are represented at the 
second grade (op. cit. note 48, 558). 
84 AT VI 130, CSM I 167. 
85 AT VI 137, CSM I 170. 
86 Ibid. 
87 AT VI 138, CSM I 170. I quote from the translation of the Discourse on Method, 
Optics, Geometry and Meteorology by Paul J. Olscamp (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001), 
106. 
88 Ibid. 
89 AT VI 138, CSM I 172. 
90 AT VI 138-40, CSM I 172, Olscamp 107. 
91 AT VI 140, CSM I 172, Olscamp 107. 
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the nearer’.92 If we look at two ships out at sea, one smaller than the other but 
proportionately closer so that they appear equal in size, ‘we will be able to judge 
[juger] which is farther away’ by the difference in their shapes and colours and the 
light they send to us.
93
  
 As this summary indicates, Descartes accords processes of judging a central 
role in our perception of distance. The same is true of our perception of the size and 
shape of objects, since he holds that the perception of these is ‘wholly included’ in the 
way we see the distance and position of their parts.
94
 He explains that 
 
‘we judge [s’estime] their size by the knowledge or opinion we have of their distance, 
compared with the size of the images they imprint on the back of the eye’.95 
 
Moreover, he thinks it equally obvious that ‘shape is judged [se juge] by the 
knowledge, or opinion, that we have of the position of the various parts of the 
object’.96 He cites the fact that retinal images usually contain only ovals and 
rhombuses when they make us see circles and squares. Because we know (or believe) 
that the object we are looking at is positioned at an angle to our line of sight, we judge 




These passages from the Optics indicate the extent to which processes of 
reasoning and judgement are involved in seeing.
 98
 The size, distance and shape of 
distal objects cannot be determined on the basis of the two-dimensional image alone. 
The visual perception of these features depends on processes of reasoning and judging 
that combine information present in the image with information from other sources.
99
 
                                                        
92 Ibid. In this case, presumably, the greater brightness of the mountain would lead us 
to judge it to be nearer than the forest, if we did not already know that the forest was 
in front of it. 
93 Ibid. It is not completely clear what is meant to be going on in this example, but 
perhaps Descartes’s point is that we will judge a ship to be nearer if we perceive its 
shape and colour more distinctly. (He has already explained why different colours 
cannot be discriminated in distant objects, AT VI 134, CSM I 168-9.) 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. Descartes explains the phenomenon of size constancy by appeal to the nature 
of these judgements. We obviously do not judge the size of objects by the absolute 
size of the retinal image alone, he says, because we do not see objects as a hundred 
times larger when they are close to us, even if the image they produce on the retina is 
a hundred times larger than the one they produce when ten times further away. 
Instead, we see them as the same size, but far away. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
98This is emphasised in the Sixth Replies, where Descartes writes that he explained in 
the Optics ‘how size, distance and shape can be perceived by reasoning alone, which 
works out any one feature from the others’ (AT VII 438, CSM II 295). 
99 Alongside these references to judgement, Hatfield sees Descartes as presenting an 
account of distance perception as purely psychophysical (op. cit. note 78, 356-7). In 
the Treatise on Man (AT XI 170, CSM I 106), he depicts perceptions of distance as 
depending directly on changes in the pineal gland. In the Optics (AT VI 137, CSM I 
170), he says that changes in the shape of the eye are accompanied by changes in the 
brain ‘ordained by nature’ to make the soul perceive distance. Even on this 
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These judgements occur beyond the second grade of sensation, but are nonetheless 
involved in the construction of visual experience. Borrowing a term from Simmons, I 
call them ‘constructive judgements’.100 Why should constructive judgements be 
thought to pose a further problem of error? 
 
12. Erroneous constructive judgements and the goodness of God 
 
Firstly, the constructive judgements that figure in the seeing of position, distance, 
shape and size are very often wrong. This is inevitable, since ‘all our methods for 
recognising distance are highly unreliable’.101 Consider, for example, the first and 
second methods of estimating distance, which depend on the shape of the eye and the 
visual angles respectively. The shape of the eye varies hardly at all, Descartes says, 
when the object is more than four or five feet away, and even when it is closer it 
varies so little that ‘we cannot have any precise cognizance of it’.102 If we are looking 
at an object at all far way, there is very little variation in the visual angle. This, he 
claims, is why the moon and the sun look so much smaller than they are. Our methods 
for registering distance represent them as no more than one or two hundred feet away, 
and this false estimate leads to a false constructive judgement of their size. We see 
them as one or two feet across at the most, he says, although we know through reason 
that they are very much larger.
103
  
 Secondly, a case can be made for regarding constructive judgements as ones 
that we have a natural propensity to make. This point can also be illustrated by the 
perceived size of the sun. The constructive judgement of size responsible for our 
visual experience of the sun is made on the basis of the size of the two-dimensional 
image the sun projects, combined with information about distance gleaned from 
sources that are unreliable. The knowledge that the information is false, that the sun is 
very far away and very large indeed, does not enable us to stop making the 
constructive judgement; the sun goes on looking as it always did.
 
 This is reason to 
think that the constructive judgement is dictated by our nature - that it is a 
consequence of the way we mind-body composites are set up to perceive distance, 
size and shape. But if God has given us a natural propensity to make erroneous 
constructive judgements, that poses a problem of error distinct from any discussed so 
far. 
However, a case can also be made for the contrary view that our tendency to 
make constructive judgements is due to habit, not natural propensity. After all, in the 
Sixth Replies Descartes associates visual error about the shape of a stick with 
judgements made through habit. If these false judgements are habitual, they are our 
responsibility, and our tendency to form them is no more problematic from the point 
of view of God’s goodness than our tendency to form false resemblance judgements. 
To weigh the case for regarding constructive judgements as natural, we need to 
consider the case for the contrary view.  
                                                                                                                                                              
psychophysical account, processes of reasoning and judgement would presumably be 
needed to yield perceptions of shape and size, but vision would involve fewer 
(erroneous) judgements. 
100 Op. cit. note 48, 569. Though I disagree with it on some details, I have learned 
much from Simmons’ paper. 





13. A natural propensity to false constructive judgements? 
 
Speaking of how we see the size, shape and distance of a stick in the Sixth Replies, 
Descartes speaks of ‘judgements, or even rational inferences, about the things that 
affect our senses’ that are made at great speed because of habit, judgements made 
since childhood.
104
 This may seem to provide clear evidence that he regards 
constructive judgements about size, shape and distance as made through habit.
105
 But 
the discussion in the Sixth Replies is open to differing interpretations. Does it concern 
resemblance judgements, which are acknowledged to be habitual, or constructive 
judgements, the status of which is in question? To say a stick in water appears bent 
because of refraction, Descartes claims, is to say that it appears in a way that would 
lead a child to judge it to be bent. But is he speaking here of the constructive 
judgement that determines how the stick visually appears, or of the resemblance 
judgement that the child may make on the basis of that appearance? The fact that he 
says that we adults may also judge it to be bent, if we follow the prejudices of 
childhood, suggests that he is referring to a judgement that can be corrected. This is 
most plausibly taken to be the resemblance judgement. We adults know that the stick 
in water is straight despite its visual appearance, so we can correct the false childhood 
judgement that it is bent. But even if we do, the visual appearance of the stick in water 
remains the same. So the judgement we correct is not the constructive judgement that 
determines the visual appearance of the stick, but the resemblance judgement—the 
rash childhood judgement that the stick is just as it appears. This would make the 
point that Descartes is aiming for here: that adult judgements are more reliable than 
childhood judgements. 
 Later in the Sixth Replies, Descartes speaks of astronomers who know that the 
sun is larger than the earth, but cannot prevent themselves from judging it to be 
smaller when they turn their eyes to it.
106
 He compares them to those who have an 
inveterate habit of affirming judgements made since childhood.
107
 Does this not show 
that he regards the constructive judgement of the sun’s size as habitual? Again, the 
text is open to differing interpretations. There are two false judgements in this case, 
the false constructive judgement responsible for the visual appearance of the sun, and 
the false resemblance judgement that the sun is as small as it appears. Descartes uses 
the case to illustrate the difficulty of abandoning an habitual judgement. Is it the 
constructive judgement that is the habitual judgement in question, or the resemblance 
judgement? The text tolerates both readings. Here as elsewhere, though, Descartes’s 
concern is with false resemblance judgements. He uses the passage to illustrate how 
difficult it is to relinquish false habitual opinions about the natures of mind and body. 
Clearly he thinks these opinions can be corrected; the arguments of the Meditations 
are designed precisely to correct them. So the illustration better serves Descartes’s 
purposes if these opinions are compared to the astronomer’s habitual resemblance 
                                                        
104 AT VII 438, CSM II 295. 
105 For example, see Hatfield, op. cit. note 78, 357-8 and Alison Simmons, ‘Spatial 
Perception from a Cartesian Point of View’, Philosophical Topics 31 (2003) 395-423, 
398. 
106 AT VII 440, CSM II 296. 
107 AT VII 446, CSM II 300. The same comparison appears in the later Principles of 
Philosophy, section I.72, AT VIIIA 36-7, CSM I 219-20. 
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judgement, which can be altered, rather than the constructive judgement, which 
cannot. 
 Of course, this consideration is not decisive if Descartes himself holds the 
view that the constructive judgement of the sun’s size resists alteration only because it 
is entrenched by habit.
108
 But that view is extremely implausible. Descartes clearly 
regards it as possible to correct errors in habitual judgements as a result of rational 
reflection, even though it is difficult to do. The error in the constructive judgement of 
the sun’s size is not difficult, but impossible to alter through rational reflection. This 
is not surprising, since the errors in these different judgements originate in very 
different ways. The error in the habitual judgement that the sun is the size it visually 
appears to be is due to lack of reflection; it is a resemblance judgement made without 
good grounds in childhood, and thoughtlessly affirmed through habit since then. The 
error in the constructive judgement of the sun’s size is due to false information 
derived from unreliable methods of judging distance. Our judgements of distance are 
unreliable not because they are based on childhood habits, but because of limitations 
in the way the visual system works. That is good reason to regard the errors in our 
constructive judgements as errors we are disposed to make by the nature God has 





14. Constructive judgements and natural deceptions of the senses 
 
If these erroneous constructive judgements flow from our nature, can they be handled 
in the same way as so-called errors of nature, such as sensations of pain in a missing 
limb? Since these natural errors are explained as the inevitable consequence of the 
way we mind-body composites are constituted, so this proposal may seem promising 
at first. However, Descartes’s solution to the problem of errors of nature does not 
generalise in any straightforward way to the problem of error in constructive 
judgements. The explanation of errors of nature turns on the claim that although God 
has benevolently devised the signalling system that best preserves health in usual 
conditions, misleading sensations can still occur when the body is damaged or 
diseased. In these unusual conditions, sensations can be caused by bodily conditions 
other than the one they are intended to signal to the mind. But erroneous constructive 
judgements do not fit this model. False estimates of distance and erroneous 
constructive judgements about shape and size do not happen occasionally, when 
conditions are unusual or when the body is damaged or diseased. They occur 
                                                        
108 The fact that Descartes speaks of the difficulty of ‘imagining’ the sun and stars as 
being larger than we are accustomed to do may be a sign that he is tempted by this 
view, if ‘imagine’ is read as an allusion to experience. This terminology appears in 
the Sixth Replies, AT VII 446, CSM II 300 and the Principles, AT VIIIA 37, CSM I 
220. 
109 As noted earlier (note 48), Simmons denies that constructive judgements involve 
the will. She takes them to involve mental operations falling ‘somewhere between the 
mere perception of ideas and the affirmation by the will of whatever those ideas 
present to the mind’ (op. cit. note 48, 566). These operations yield sensory 
experience, which cannot be revised, rather than belief, which can (see 567). Some 
kind of affirmation still seems to be involved here, even if it does not involve the will; 
so even on this view, we are so constructed as to naturally affirm falsehoods, though 
not because of a natural propensity to believe.  
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routinely, as a consequence of the ordinary functioning of the visual system. 
Moreover, the claim that a visual system that functions in this way is the best that 
could be devised seems hard to defend. It is not difficult to imagine changes to the 
system that could produce more reliable estimates of the distance of objects, such as 
greater variation in the shape of the eye, or in the visual angle. Finally, unlike 
naturally deceptive sensations, the visual errors we are concerned with are errors in 
judgement. It seems more troubling to suppose that the routine operation of our God-
given visual system compels us to act incorrectly, by affirming falsehoods, than it 
does to suppose that God has created an internal signalling system that occasionally 
produces erroneous sensations.  
Even though the model Descartes uses to reconcile natural errors with God’s 
goodness does not fit error in constructive judgements, the focus on sensations may 
suggest a more promising line of thought. Descartes emphasises that our senses are 
given to us for the preservation of life, to present bodies to us in ways that indicate 
their potential to help or harm us. So, we might think, there is no surprise, and no 
conflict with God’s goodness, in the occurrence of false judgements in the operation 
of a visual system that aims at preservation rather than truth. According to this line of 
thought, the putative problem of error simply dissolves when we take account of the 
true function of the senses.  
This solution has been used to explain how Descartes reconciles our supposed 
natural propensity to form false resemblance judgements with the goodness of God. It 
is fine for the senses to dispose us to false judgements, the thought goes, since the 
senses aim at survival rather than truth.
110
 I have argued that the reconciliation is 
unnecessary, since Descartes denies that we have such a natural propensity. But if we 
do have a natural propensity to form false constructive judgements, why not apply the 
solution here? 
Though the solution may seem to be an appealing one, it would not be 
appealing to Descartes, or so I claim. It stands in too much tension with his view that 
there is no falsity in our God-given sensations. To see where the tension lies, it is 
helpful to briefly compare Descartes’s view with that of a later Cartesian, 
Malebranche. Malebranche appears to hold the view that some commentators attribute 
to Descartes, the view that falsity in our sensations is immaterial because they are 
given to us not to discern the truth, but for the preservation of life. Understanding how 
their views differ will help us to see why this solution would not sit well with 
Descartes. 
 
15. Malebranche on falsity in natural judgements 
 
Malebranche’s account of how vision works follows Descartes’s closely.111 Like 
Descartes, he notes the ‘considerable defects’ in our means of judging distance, and 
                                                        
110 For example, Brown writes, ‘We learn from the Sixth Meditation that the primary 
function of sensation is to deliver us the world not so as to know it but so as to 
navigate it as embodied agents. …Take seriously this idea and much can be explained 
about how the senses dispose us to judge incorrectly that the world is a certain way…’ 
(op. cit. note 52, 19).  
111 For an extended discussion of Malebranche’s account of spatial perception that 
compares it with Descartes’s, see Simmons, op. cit. note 105.  
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the consequent unreliability of all the judgements based on them.
 112
 Explaining why 
we see the moon as small even when we know it is not, he writes:  
 
‘although we might know for certain through reason that [the moon] is large and at a 
great distance, we cannot help but see it quite as near and small, because these natural 
judgements of vision occur in us, independently of us, and even in spite of us.’113 
 
What Malebranche here calls ‘natural judgements’ are clearly constructive 
judgements. For him, they are judgements made not by us, but by God. As far as we 
are concerned, they are sensations; but they are sensations corresponding to 
judgements that we would make if we had the requisite knowledge and inferential 
capacity.
114
 Since we lack that knowledge and capacity, Malebranche thinks, God 
fashions our visual perceptions in and for us in accordance with the laws of optics and 
geometry and the laws of soul and body.
115
  
Now the problem of error arises. The manifold errors in our perception of 
distance, shape and size illustrate Malebranche’s claim that ‘our eyes generally 
deceive us in everything they represent to us’.116 But why has a benevolent God 
created a system that gives us so many false judgements-cum-sensations? 
Malebranche replies that the defects in our natural judgements of distance, size and 
shape are just what one would expect in a sensory system geared to the preservation 
of life rather than the discernment of truth. For example, our methods of estimating 
distance via changes in the shape of the eye and the visual angles ‘are quite useless 
when the object is from five to six hundred paces away and are not reliable even when 
the object is closer’.117 As a result,  
 
‘we know the motion and rest of objects better as they come closer to us, and we are 
unable to judge them through the senses when they seem no longer to have any 
relation, or to have almost no relation, to our bodies (as when they are five or six 
hundred paces away and are of insignificant size, or even nearer than this and smaller, 
or finally, when they are larger but further away)’.118 
 
For Malebranche, this just goes to show that ‘our eyes were not given us to judge the 
truth of things, but only to let us know which things might inconvenience us or be of 
some use to us’.119 It is important for our survival to know about bodies that are near 
to us, and therefore in a position to help or harm us; it is not important for our survival 
                                                        
112 Nicolas Malebranche, The Search After Truth, tr. and ed. T. M. Lennon and P. J. 
Olscamp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), Book I, Part 9, 46. 
Hereafter cited as Search. 
113 Search I.7, 35, emphasis added.  
114 Search I.7, 34. Malebranche here notes that there are many errors that these 
natural judgements or compound sensations enable us to avoid. For example, we see 
people walking towards us as getting closer but not as getting larger, though the 
images they project on the retina do get larger (cf. note 95However, they are also the 
cause of many errors. 
115 Search I.9, 47.  
116Search I.6, 25.  
117 Search I.9, 43. 
118 Search I.9, 46. 
119 Search I.6, 30. 
 24 
‘to know the exact truth about things occurring in faraway places.’120 So, 
Malebranche says, the defects of vision exemplify his general doctrine about the 
senses, that they ‘inform us of things only in relation to the preservation of our bodies 
and not as they are in themselves’.121  
Consonant with this general doctrine, Malebranche holds that all our sensory 
perceptions incorporate false natural judgements. Some of these, as we have seen, 
lead to false perceptions of the size, shape and distance of bodies. Others lead us to 
falsely perceive our own sensations as existing in bodies. Our sensations of whiteness, 
coldness and pain are simply modifications of our souls, modifications that cannot 
exist in an extended body. But thanks to in-built natural judgements, we perceive 
whiteness and coldness as being in snow, and pain as being in our fingers.
122
 The 
natural judgements that make us thus project our sensations onto bodies occur ‘in us 
independently of us and even in spite of us…in connection with the preservation of 
life’.123 Pain must be felt in the finger so that we pull it away from the thorn, and 
colour must be sensed in objects so that we can distinguish them from one another.
124
 
The falsity of these natural judgements-cum-sensations accords with God’s 
benevolence, since it simply reflects the fact that the senses aim at preservation, not 
truth. We willfully go wrong, though, in habitually making free judgements that 
match these natural judgements. In making these erroneous judgements, the soul 
 
‘blindly follows sensible impressions or the natural judgements of the senses…it is 
content, as it were, to spread itself onto the objects it considers by clothing them with 
what it has stripped from itself.’125 
 
To avoid these habitual errors, we must judge in accordance with reason, which is 
given to us to discover the truth, and not in accordance with the natural judgements of 
the senses, ‘which never discover the truth and which were given only for the 
preservation of the body.’126 
 
16. Descartes and Malebranche compared 
 
How do Descartes’s views compare with those of Malebranche? One obvious 
difference is that Descartes never suggests that the defects in our means of judging 
distance, and the consequent falsity of judgements based on them, are designed to 
further our preservation. We have to make judgements about shape and size on the 
basis of judgements about distance, because information about distance is needed to 
try to reconstruct the layout of the three-dimensional objects responsible for 
projecting the two-dimensional image. Our manner of judging the distance of objects 
is unreliable because it is based on cues that are relatively insensitive to that distance, 
such as the shape of the eye and the size of the visual angle. So the falsity in 
constructive judgements is simply a consequence of the way the visual system is 
                                                        
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Search I.10, 52. 
123 Search I.11, 55. 
124Ibid. 
125 Search I.12, 58. This memorable image was later borrowed by Hume (see A 
Treatise of Human Nature, I.3.14). 
126 Search I.12, 59. 
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structured, and that is the end of the matter. Descartes gives no sign of adumbrating 
an explanation of visual error in terms of preservation of the kind that Malebranche 
gives. 
 Why does Descartes not adopt Malebranche’s solution? After all, their views 
seem very similar. Malebranche takes the view that sensory perceptions aim at 
preservation from Descartes, and both thinkers warn of the error of using perceptions 
given for this purpose as guides for free judgements about the nature of bodies. 
However, there is a fundamental difference underlying these similarities. For 
Malebranche, the mistake we make in judging in accordance with our sensations-
cum-natural judgements is that of affirming something false. Our sensory perceptions 
of size and shape illustrate the falsity of sensations particularly well, because they 
incorporate natural judgements of distance that are clearly false.
127
 For Descartes, by 
contrast, the distinctive feature of what he calls ‘the grasp of the senses’ is not that it 
is false, but that it is naturally obscure and confused.
128
 Sensory perceptions occurring 
at the second grade of sensation involve no judgement and contain no falsity. So the 
error we make in our habitual judgements is not that of affirming sensory perceptions 
that are false, but that of treating obscure and confused perceptions of bodies as 
guides for immediate judgements about their essences. Notice that Descartes does not 
say that sensory perceptions provide no information about external bodies, nor that 
they provide false information; rather, they provide information about the nature of 
external bodies, but in a form that is obscure and confused.
129
 For example, we might 
think of our sensory perception of heat in an external body as an obscure and 
confused perception of motions in its parts, or a similar property that can be 
understood in mechanical terms.
130
 On this picture, we perceive heat as located in the 
body because we are perceiving something that is actually in the body, rather than 
projecting our own sensation onto the body, as we do for Malebranche.
131
 Though our 
                                                        
127 Presumably this is one reason why Malebranche begins with them in his campaign 
to set us right by bringing us ‘to a general distrust of all the senses’ (Search I.6, 25). 
The falsity of natural judgements of distance can be used to prepare the way for his 
more controversial claims about the error of perceiving sensible qualities such as 
colour and heat in bodies. 
128 He writes, ‘in many cases the grasp of the senses is very obscure and confused’, 
AT VII 80, CSM II 55. 
129 This point is stressed by Alison Simmons, in ‘Are Cartesian Sensations 
Representational?’, Noûs 33 (1999), 347-69, 350.  
130 In Principles I.198-9, Descartes describes heat, colours and so on as nothing but 
certain arrangements or dispositions (dispositiones) in objects, depending on size, 
shape and motion (AT VIIIA 323, CSM I 285). We are accustomed to distinguish 
between and mechanical properties per se and dispositions grounded in them, but 
Descartes shows little sign of being concerned with this difference.  
131 Interpreting sensory perceptions as perceptions of features existing in bodies has 
the advantage of providing objects for them. Sensory perceptions are ideas, and all 
ideas are directed on objects. Indeed, according to the traditional model that Descartes 
inherits, ideas are objects existing in the mind. For further discussion, see my ‘Clear 
and Distinct Perception’ in J. Broughton and J. Carriero (eds.), A Companion to 
Descartes (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 217-8 and John Carriero’s very helpful 
‘Sensation and Knowledge of Body in Descartes’ Meditations’ in K. Detlefsen (ed.), 
Descartes’ Meditations: A Critical Guide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2015), particularly 117-8. 
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sensory perception of heat is not false, its obscurity and confusion means that it does 
not clearly reveal the nature of its object.
132
 That is why we are mistaken if we assume 
that we can read the true nature of bodies straight off our sensory perceptions of them 
- if we assume, for example, that heat as it exists in a body exactly resembles our 
sensory perception of heat.
133
 
For Descartes, unlike Malebranche, our perceptions of distance, size and shape 
are atypical among sensory perceptions through being false, and through involving 
judgement. When we habitually judge that the sun is small on the basis of how it 
looks, we erroneously assume that we can read the sun’s size straight off our sensory 
perception of it.
 134
  But in this case, our sensory perception of the sun’s size is not 
just obscure and confused, but false, because it reflects a false constructive 
judgement. This makes it difficult to think of our perception of the sun as small as 
simply an obscure and confused perception of its true size.  
For Malebranche, then, the preservative function of sensory perceptions 
explains why they incorporate false judgements. For Descartes, by contrast, the 
preservative function of sensory perceptions explains why they present their objects 
obscurely and confusedly. This being so, explaining the falsity of visual perceptions 
of distance, size and shape in terms of the preservative function of the senses is not an 
obvious solution for him. Moreover, Descartes’s view of sensation as a mode of 
perception that is obscure and confused, but not false, fits his conception of what 
follows from God’s goodness. Since the faculty of sensation is part of our God-given 
nature, we should not expect to find falsity in our sensory perceptions. It is quite in 
order for our sensory perceptions to be obscure and confused, because this reflects the 
imperfection of our natures as composites of mind and body. Since we are embodied 
creatures which can be helped or harmed by the bodies surrounding us, information 
about those bodies needs to be provided in a format that makes relevant features 
salient and is easy to use for survival.
135
 That is just what the senses provide. The 
falsity of sensory perceptions is no part of this story. But the constructive judgements 
involved in our perception of distance, size and shape seem to have a claim to be both 
natural and false. The fact that they are natural, that they are judgements we have a 
God-given propensity to make, creates pressure for them to be true. Hence these 
judgements are problematic for Descartes in a way they are not for Malebranche. 
                                                        
132 This is the view I suggest in op. cit. note 131, 229. Gary Hatfield interprets the 
obscurity and confusion of sensory ideas in this way in ‘Descartes on Sensory 
Representation, Objective Reality, and Material Falsity’ in K. Detlefsen (ed.), op. cit. 
note 131, 141. 
133 Malebranche and Descartes agree that we habitually mistake the purpose of 
sensory perceptions when we match our free judgements to them, but they differ over 
the nature of our mistake. For Malebranche, we mistakenly assume that sensory 
perceptions aim at truth. For Descartes, we mistakenly assume that sensory 
perceptions clearly reveal the nature of their objects (i.e., what they are perceptions 
of). 
134 In the Third Meditation, Descartes contrasts our visual perception of the sun’s size 
with astronomers’ calculations of its size to illustrate lack of resemblance between 
objects and sensory perceptions (AT VII 39, CSM II 27). The example is dialectically 
useful because it requires no controversial assumptions about the nature of sensible 
qualities. 






I have argued that Descartes’s account of vision suggests that we are subject to a 
species of error that does not fit his solutions to the problems posed by errors of 
judgement and errors of nature. If this is right, then the errors of the senses he invokes 
in the opening paragraphs of the Meditations, errors in our perceptions of objects that 
are very small and very far away, are more problematic than he recognises. Here an 
obvious question arises: If that is so, why did Descartes himself not recognise it? The 
answer may lie in his differing concerns as a physiologist and as a philosopher. In the 
Optics, where his account of visual perception appears, he aims to explain how vision 
works within in terms of a mechanism interacting with a mind, without making use of 
the Aristotelian notion of the transmission of a likeness. Judgement figures in his 
account because the two-dimensional image alone does not suffice to determine the 
size, shape, position of the objects that produced it. Information about distance must 
be acquired and incorporated by processes of inference and judgement. In the 
Meditations, by contrast, Descartes is concerned to combat the Aristotelian view that 
all the materials of thought come from the senses. He aims to show that the blueprint 
for our understanding of the underlying nature of the physical world comes from an 
idea of body that is innate in our minds. We perceive the physical world through our 
senses in an obscure and confused manner that is designed primarily to aid our 
preservation. Here his emphasis is on the error of assuming that sensory perceptions 
clearly reveal the essences of their objects, so that we can read the nature of the 
physical world straight off them. Our tendency to judge that bodies are exactly as they 
appear to our senses is not natural, but habitual, so it lacks the divine mandate of 
innate ideas. From the perspective of Descartes’s plan of invoking the errors of the 
senses to help guide to us to a grasp of the innate ideas given by God to lead us to a 
true understanding of the nature of the world and of ourselves, false judgements of 
vision are easily overlooked. 
 
 
 
 
